In Memoriam Bischof TING Kuang Hsun
China Christian Council - Bischof TING
Bischof Ting starb in Nanjing im Alter von 97 Jahren.
Sein Name ist mit der chinesischen evangelischen Kirche auf das engste verbunden. Obwohl er sich von seinen kirchenleitenden Ämtern bereits 1995 zurückgezogen hatte, blieb er weiterhin Ehrenpräsident der Ginling Theologischen Hochschule in Nanjing, Ebenfalls war er Ehrenvorsitzender des Chinesischen Christenrates (CCC) und der Chinesischen Christlichen Patriotischen Drei-Selbst Bewegung (PDSB). Nach seiner Pensionierung wurde er wie ein ‚Patriarch’ verehrt. Er gab den Anstoß zu einer theologischen Bewegung, die noch nicht abgeschlossen ist, mit dem Ziel, für die Kirche eine angemessene chinesische Theologie zu entwickeln.
The Potential of Japanese Civil Society
Poltik in Japan - 16.12. Unterhauswahlen
What is Required for a New Society and Politics:
The Potential of Japanese Civil Society
By Iida Tetsunari
Translated by John Junkerman
Japan stands at a major crossroads.
The crisis that began on March 11, 2011 at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant made the fundamental transformation of Japanese society and politics unavoidable, and it also provides the context that pushes that transformation ahead.
Even before 3.11, Japan was in a state of collapse. One of the major causes of this was certainly the deterioration of the framework of political parties, the bureaucracy, and business that has prevailed since the Meiji era and throughout the postwar, and this breakdown led to the catastrophic accident in Fukushima. Faced with this catastrophe, many people concluded that this social and political deterioration had to be remedied and Japan's energy and nuclear power policies had to be fundamentally changed. We are witnessing a once-in-a-century opportunity where such change is possible.
At the same time, more than 18 months have passed since 3.11, and the "nuclear village" is regaining its footing while politics hurtles along toward epochal failure. We are beginning to hear voices of despair: "Even after an accident on that scale, nothing changes?"
Is it possible to shift this despair concerning politics into the energy for reform? What is required for a new society and politics? How can we empower civil society to propose and implement new policies? I would like to address these questions.
The Historical Inevitability of the Fukushima Accident
The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima nuclear power plant was clearly caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, but it was not a chance occurrence. It is more aptly called a historical inevitability. Even if that accident didn't happen on that day at that power plant, it was unfortunately just a matter of time before some catastrophic accident occurred at some nuclear power plant.
Änderung der Verfassung in Japan?
Poltik in Japan - Artikel 9 der Verfassung
Braucht Japan eine neue Verfassung?
(Rikkyo Universität, Tokyo)
Umfragen zufolge unterstützen derzeit 92% der japanischen Bevölkerung (Sankei News, 31.8.2012) eine Verfassungsänderung. Dieser Prozentsatz stellt den höchsten Zuspruch in der Geschichte der Nachkriegsverfassung dar. Freilich wurde praktisch seit ihrer Proklamation im Jahr 1946 insbesondere über die Interpretation von Artikel 9 und seit den 1990ern zunehmend auch über die Berechtigung einer „von außen aufgedrückten" Verfassung als solcher diskutiert. Dennoch überrascht eine derartig hohe Unterstützung für eine Änderung so manchen Beobachter. Nun darf dieser Prozentsatz nicht von vornherein als Ausdruck zunehmender reaktionärer Stimmung interpretiert werden. Vielseitig sind die Gründe für diese Entwicklung. Vielfältig sind auch die Entwürfe, die zur Diskussion stehen. Dennoch steht es für nicht wenige Japaner –– unter ihnen auch Christen –– außer Zweifel, daß dieser Umschwung der öffentlichen Meinung kritisch beurteilt werden muß.
Der folgende Artikel soll einen bescheidenen Beitrag zur kritischen Beurteilung leisten und dem ausländischen Leser und Weltbürger Einblick in die gegenwärtigen politischen Bedürfnisse Japans bieten. Der Fokus soll hierbei auf Artikel 9 liegen,
Japanese Citizens' Appeal: Stop the ... Territorial Disputes
Takeshima und Senkaku Inselgruppen
Der Aggressor Japan sollte zuerst seine eigene Geschichte reflektieren
Eine Erklärung von 1.300 Intelektuellen
(Joong Ang Ilbo, English Version am 29.09.2012)
OE Kenzaburo (83, 1994 erhielt er den Nobelpreis für Literatur) und 1.300 weitere Intelektuelle und bürgerliche Gruppen unterschrieben eine Erklärung zu den territorialen Streitigkeiten zwischen Japan und China bzw. Korea.
Die Erklärung reflektiert die Annexion von Takeshima (kor. Dokdo) durch Japan im Gefolge des Russisch-Japanischen Krieges im Jahre 1905. Korea war damals bereits japanische Kolonie. So steht Dokdo als Symbol für Aggression und Kolonialismus Japans. Die Erklärung fordert, dass Japan diese Tatsache anzuerkennen habe.
Hinter dem territorialen Konflikt der beiden Inselgruppen Dokdo und Senkaku steht die Aggression Japans in Asian. Das sollte niemand in Japan jemals vergessen. Die Japaner müssen ihre eigene Geschichte reflektieren.
Die Senkaku Inseln, der Streitgegenstand zwischen China und Japan, kommt durch die Erklärung des Gouverneurs von Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, an die Oberfläche zur Zeit des 40jährigen Gedenkens an die Normalisierung der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Tokyo und Beijing.
Die Erklärung der 1.300 will die Wurzeln des Streits offen legen und fordert die Politik auf, auf die Stimme des Volkes in Japan zu hören.
"Global Research" (Kanada) schreibt am 1. Oktober 2012 dazu:
Novelist Kenzaburo Oe:
Japan should Reflect on its Colonial History
On the Diaoyu Islands issue, the Japanese government has attempted to turn back the wheel of history,
October 01, 2012
Commentary: Japanese government must listen to voices of reason
Kenzaburō Ōe: Categorical imperative to renounce war forever
BEIJING: Japanese novelist Kenzaburo Oe, a Nobel laureate, has called on the Japanese government to reflect on its view of history and stop creating a "vicious cycle" on the Diaoyu Islands issue.
A civic group's statement, endorsed by about 1,300 Japanese people, including Oe, said on Friday that the root cause of the souring Japan-China ties on its 40th anniversary is Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara's announcement of "buying" the islands, and the subsequent "nationalization" of the islands by the Japanese government.
"The most important thing for Japan is to recognize and reflect on its historical issues," the statement stressed, referring to Japan's invasion of its neighboring countries during World War II, and to "honestly express that both to itself and to other countries."
Such are the voices of reason from the people. The statement has given a remarkably objective analysis of the crux of the Diaoyu Islands issue that has plunged the China-Japan relations to a historical low.
The Diaoyu Islands have been a silent witness to the Japanese aggression and colonization. The Japanese government has not yet, even to this day, given up its colonialist attitude to Asia, attempting to "legitimize" the land it stole from China and continue its colonization.
Such a move is an open denial of the outcomes of the victory of the world anti-fascist war, and a grave challenge to the post-war world order. Moreover, it severely hurts the feelings of the people in the countries that it had invaded only decades ago.
On the Diaoyu Islands issue, the Japanese government has attempted to turn back the wheel of history, which seriously undermined the political foundation of the China-Japan ties and set the bilateral ties, even the entire region, in a dangerous direction.
As a matter of fact, Japan's provocation has not only led to worsening tension over the Diaoyu Islands, but also will ultimately boomerang on itself.
China's Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng has recently warned that Japan should abandon the illusion that it can occupy the Diaoyu Islands and that sending a few envoys to China to explain the issue will be the end of it.
It is clear that China will by no means tolerate a two-faced partner, which talks of friendly ties and cooperation on the one hand but intentionally creates damage on the other.
To maintain a healthy China-Japan relationship, efforts on both sides are needed and the onus does not only fall on China.
Now it is crucial for the Japanese government to make some real efforts to rein in domestic rightist sentiments and to prevent the ugly scenario of a militarism resurrection.
Nobody should be so foolish as to interpret China's commitment to peaceful development as being weak and easily bullied or to even take advantage of that to grab the Chinese territory.
Any idea that China would sit idle to see its rightful land stolen by a foreign country will always remain a mere illusion.
The recent moves by the Japanese side concerning the Diaoyu Islands have played havoc on the China-Japan relationship, which has entered its 40th year since far-sighted leaders on both sides overcame great challenges and normalized the bilateral ties.
At such a critical juncture, the wise choice for the Japanese government is to listen to voices of reason from both its own people and the international community, give due respect to history and reality, and forgo the illusion that it could grab the Diaoyu Islands from China if it tries hard enough.
It is indeed desirable for all that the China-Japan relations return to the right track as soon as possible.
The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal. The CRG is a registered non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada.
Der vollständige Text der Erklärung der 1300:
Power Politics in Japan
Poltik in Japan - Die Atomkraft-Lobby
Power Politics: Japan's Resilient Nuclear Village
The Fukushima nuclear accident spurred expectations in the Japanese public and around the world that Japan would pull the plug on nuclear energy. Indeed, in July 2011 Prime Minister Kan Naoto announced that he no longer believed that nuclear reactors could be operated safely in Japan because it is so prone to devastating earthquakes and tsunami; by May 2012 all of Japan's 50 viable reactors were shut down for safety inspections. Plans to boost nuclear energy to 50% of Japan's electricity generating capacity were scrapped and in 2012 the government introduced subsidies to boost renewable energy. Incredibly, an aroused public took to the streets in the largest display of activism since the turbulent 1960s as the summer of discontent featured numerous demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of anti-nuclear protestors. Moreover, public opinion polls indicate that more than 70% of Japanese want to phase out nuclear energy by 2030.
The government went through the motions of consulting public opinion, but found that 81% of those it surveyed came up with the 'wrong' answer, favoring the zero nuclear option by 2030. Ironically, the government then held seminars to educate selected citizens about the pros and cons of nuclear energy, hoping that this would produce a better result but the before and after surveys reveal that the more people know about nuclear energy the less likely they are to support it. However, the public was never going to have the final say on something as important as national energy strategy and the nuclear village has intervened to 'save' the people from their 'misguided' views on the dangers of nuclear energy.
As I argued in early September in a lengthy analysis of "Japan's Nuclear Village", the deck is stacked in favor of the pro-nuclear advocates of the nuclear village and it is unlikely that public opposition will trump the networks of power defending nuclear energy. But the speed and extent of the nuclear village's revanchism has been stunning. The marginalization of public opinion is evident in three significant policy developments. First, on September 14, 2012 the Noda Cabinet appeared to endorse a gradual phase-out of nuclear power by the late 2030s, but within days quickly disavowed this plan under heavy pressure from business lobby groups. (Asahi 9/19/2012, Asahi 10/4/2012, Japan Times, 10/6/12) It has not officially endorsed a new national energy plan and explained that any decision on energy policy is subject to ongoing review in light of future developments. PM Noda expressed the ambiguity thus: "We need a strategy with both a firm
Japan's Nuclear Village
Sicherheit in Nordostasien
Japan's Nuclear Village
by Jeff Kingston
The "nuclear village" is the term commonly used in Japan to refer to the institutional and individual pro-nuclear advocates who comprise the utilities, nuclear vendors, bureaucracy, Diet (Japan's parliament), financial sector, media and academia. This is a village without boundaries or residence cards, an imagined collective bound by solidarity over promoting nuclear energy. If it had a coat of arms the motto would be "Safe, Cheap and Reliable". There is considerable overlap with the so-called 'Iron Triangle' of big business, the bureaucracy and Liberal Democratic Party that called the shots in Japan from the mid-1950s, and the evocative moniker 'Japan, Inc.', a reference to cooperative ties between the government and private sector. The nuclear village is convenient shorthand to describe a powerful interest group with a specific agenda, one that it has effectively and profitably promoted since the 1950s. (McCormack 2011)
On the eve of March 11, 2011 Japan had 54 nuclear reactors generating nearly one-third of its total electricity supply, evidence of just how influential this interest group was in promoting its agenda. Over the years, as Japan's nuclear sector grew, so did the nuclear village's power and influence. (Hymans 2011) There has been a proliferation of vested interests in nuclear power that benefit from its expansion ranging from the companies directly involved to lenders and investors in nuclear energy-related firms and extending down to grant-seeking academic researchers. The nuclear village is not monolithic on policy, and there are disagreements between members over various issues that are bitterly contested, but these are the squabbles of a gated community where cooperation and reciprocity prevail. The Village shares a common commitment to nuclear energy, and that means ostracizing naysayers and critics and denying them the access and benefits that "members" enjoy. This modern version of the traditional practice of murahachibu (village exclusion) has been the stick, while access to vast resources and corridors of power are the carrot. Researchers who don't support the Village consensus on the need, safety, reliability and economic logic of nuclear power don't get grants and are denied promotions. Journalists who criticize the nuclear village are denied access and other perks, while politicians seeking contributions, and media companies eager for a slice of the utilities' massive advertising budgets, trim their sails accordingly. Crossing the nuclear village carries consequences just as support has delivered benefits; during the Fukushima crisis the chairman of TEPCO was in China treating favored members of some of Japan's largest media organizations to a luxury junket.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (before)
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (after)
Regulatory Capture and the Culture of Safety
Regulatory capture refers to the situation where regulators charged with promoting the public interest defer to the wishes and advance the agenda of the industry or sector they ostensibly regulate. Those with a vested interest in specific policy or regulatory outcomes lobby regulators and influence their choices and actions. Frank von Hippel, a nuclear physicist and expert on nuclear policy at Princeton University, argues that in the US, "Nuclear power is a textbook example of the problem of 'regulatory capture' — in which an industry gains control of an agency meant to regulate it." (von Hippel 2011) In Japan, nuclear regulators have also long been regulating in the interests of the regulated. (Ramseyer 2012)
Three investigations into the Fukushima disaster reveal that regulatory capture was at the heart of the nuclear
Südkorea: Einreise verweigern und Deportation!
Einreiseverweigerung & Deportationen 2011-2012
Südkorea: Einreise verweigern und Deportation!Unsere Liste ist noch unvollständig, aber beeindruckend. Die südkoreanische Regierung wehrt sich mit Nachdruck gegen Observierung von außen, gegen Solidarität mit den Dorfbewohnern von Gangjeong, gegen die Stimmen, die ans Licht bringen, was das koreanische Militär verhindern will: dass nämlich in Gangjeong, am Südende der Friedensinsel Chejudo, der neue Kriegshafen entstehen soll, gefordert von den USA.
Die Quellen der hier zusammengestellten Liste sind zumeist die Zeitungen in Südkorea und die Nachrichten der Betroffenen. Insgesamt sollen es inzwischen 21 Personen sein.
04.09. CHA Im Ok wird die Einreise im Internationalen Flughafen Incheon ohne Erklärung verweigert (gehört zum Emergency Action Committee to Save Jeju Island)
29.06. OUCHI Teruo wird die Einreise verweigert (AWC; Asian Wide Campaign)
05.06. ARFIME Yuri wird die Einreise verweigert (von Okinawa)
06.04. TOMIYAMA Masahiro wird die Einreise verweigert (von Okinawa)
02.04. UMISEDO Yutaka wird die Einreise verweigert (Musiker)
31.03. YAGI Ryuji wird die Einreise verweigert im Internationalen Flughafen Jeju (Peace activist)
27.03. NAKAMURA Sugaew wird die Einreise verweigert (Teacher von Fukuoka)
14.03. Elliot Adams, Tarak Kauff & Mike Hastie wird die Einreise verweigert (US Veterans aus dem Koreakrieg)
März Mario Damato, Keung Fung Ka & Rashid Kang wird die Einreise verweigert (Greenpeace East Asia)
März SATO Daisuke wird die Einreise verweigert (NNAF)
27.01. IKEDA Takane wird die Einreise verweigert (AWC: Asian Wide Campaign)
26.08. SAKODA Hidefumi & YAUCHI Yukiko wird die Einreise verweigert (Asian Wide Campaign, Japan coordinators)