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**ASIA TSUSHIN, English Edition**

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Editor's Note

The present Japan seems to look quite care-free to onlookers like travelers arriving at the airport from other economically stricken East Asian countries. They express their surprise to find that people in Japan, especially young people, appear to be unconcerned with what is going on outside their own country. They must be certainly aware of the declining domestic economy, for instance, but their concern seems to be self-sufficient, so to speak, being disconnected to similar issues outside Japan. However, there are worrisome things taking place in this country, which may have an extensive effect, and yet the majority of people just do not seem to take them seriously. One such issue is that of the Japan-U.S. security relationship defined by what is called the New Defence Cooperation Guidelines.

In such a society, those who are concerned with unavoidable social issues tend to look unrealistic and detached from the rest, and, as a consequence, less and less people become interested in supporting NGOs like ours. In the meantime, the books written by particular Japan-chauvinists are selling like bread. We do not want to sound too pessimistic, but the situation looks quite gloomy. Readers may understand this by reading the first article of this issue, which is the keynote speech given at the current Japan-U.S. NCC Consultation held near Tokyo, entitled "The Challenge of Christ, Our Peace: Working Together for Peace and Justice".

The article on Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests was written at our request soon after the detonations, and was first carried in Japanese translation by our Japanese Asia Tsushin. The two other last articles also appeared in it.

As you will see, this issue again is a combined issue as the last one, and we hope subscribers will understand, seeing so many pages devoted to the first thesis. We would also like to call your attention to the fact that all Japanese names from this issue will be written in the order as they are used by the Japanese: the family name first, and the given name last. There has been some confusion in general as to the practice, and we want to be consistent hereafter.

We wish our friends joyous Christmas and a happy New Year in spite of grim realities surrounding us.
Time for reorientation

I think we all share the sense that we are in a world undergoing great changes, historic to be sure, as we step into a new century and millennium. We are at a point of history where we can well command a whole view of this century for reevaluation. We know that the past cannot be undone, but I think we are now called upon to critically examine the past with regard to the relationships and structures which have been carried over from the past to the present, if we are anxious, as we all are, to build a more peaceful, socially just and ecologically sustainable future. I am convinced that the U.S.—Japan relationship is certainly one of those elements which should be put to a critical review from the vantage point of the present oriented toward a better future.

In this context, we note a few things that are relevant for our review and future orientation. First, the Cold War between the two antagonistic camps ended, second, one of the antagonistic camps called the socialist camp, which had played a major determinant role for most part of the century, collapsed, ushering in the global sway of "free market" and "free enterprises" in the name of globalization, and third, under this regime of globalization the economic gaps between the Global North and Global South are widening, and fourth, irreparable destruction of global environment is under way under this regime, and last, the glaring inequality this regime aggravates has given rise to chaotic situations characterized by people—to—people conflicts and outbursts of all kinds of fundamentalism.

Thus we face the fundamental question: what our position vis-à-vis this globalization regime and its workings should be. Are we to accept this regime as the only possible option for human society and thus agree to the basic position that in order to maintain order on behalf of this regime the threat and use of military force—nuclear deterrence, power projection capability, counter-terrorist state terrorism—is the inevitable, if not desirable, path to a secure future? I have profound doubt about it. For it seems obvious to me that the conflicts and instability cannot be remedied by merely trying to suppress them by exercise of force and violence. It is the status quo whose justice and legitimacy should first be questioned. If we are talking about security, we must be clear whose security we are talking about. By security do we mean the security of the dominant powers, multinational corporations, power elite, and the like? Which are we talking about, state security or the people's security? There should certainly be an alternative gateway to the future. Though we do not know the exact configuration of what is in store, we do know that what we opt for and work for now matters. It is within this framework that we are going to discuss the recent development in the U.S.—Japan security alliance.

_Muto Ichiiyo is co-president of the People's Plan Study Group._
U.S. Presence in the Postwar Japanese Statehood

Now what is happening in the Asian-Pacific region and U.S.-Japan security relationship as the aftermath of the end of the Cold War? It would be hard to believe that as far as the U.S.-Japan relations are concerned, military arrangements are being rapidly reinforced. In fact, the climate shrouding the U.S.-Japan alliance is more warlike than during the Cold War period. This is a bit strange, to say the least. Obviously, the U.S.-Japan military alliance was born out of the Cold War. If the Soviet Union was the major hypothetical enemy for America and its ally, Japan, the enemy is gone. What would logically follow, one would expect, would be a peace dividend—reducing forward-deployed U.S. troops and bases, reviewing the Cold War-based military alliance, reducing Japan’s military commitment, searching for an alternative security arrangement, and taking steps toward denuclearization and demilitarization of the Asian-Pacific region. But exactly the opposite is happening. The U.S.-Japan military alliance is being redefined, not reviewed, into a new war arrangement that makes Japan more war-ready than during the Cold War. The new Asian-Pacific doctrine the United States has proclaimed proposes to strengthen and perpetuate the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and parcels out for Japan a heavy military role never assigned to it even at the height of the Cold War. This arrangement obligates Japan to mobilize its resources, personnel, facilities, and services as well as its military force to fight a war with America outside Japan, in fact anywhere in the world. The arrangement crystallized in the form of a new version of U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Joint Defense (Guidelines heretofore), which is a revised version of the 1978 joint program bearing the same title.

But before going to the most recent development, let me first briefly look back on the nature of the U.S.-Japan military alliance in the past fifty years.

In the immediate postwar years, the U.S. military arrangement in Asia was built and entrenched for confrontation with the Communist Camp centering on the Soviet Union. Postwar Japan was integrated organically with this hegemonic arrangement. The Korean war was fought by U.S. forces directly from bases in Japan. The San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951, which ended the occupation, was coupled with the first Security Treaty under which the U.S. forces stayed on in Japan. The treaty was revised in 1960 in confrontation with the most powerful popular protest in postwar Japan. The treaty represented a military alliance in which an armed attack on either side in the Japanese territory should be countered jointly and that the U.S. military can use facilities and areas in Japan to "contribute to international peace and security in the Far East." Under this treaty, the U.S. secured major naval, air, and logistic bases in mainland Japan, including Yokosuka used as the home-port of the Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers. The Japanese bases, logistic and repair capabilities were used and mobilized for the war in Vietnam.

The Ryukyu Islands were treated differently in this setting. Occupied by the U.S. after the fiercest battles in the Pacific War in which 160,000 civilians were killed, main island Okinawa was turned into the largest overseas American bastion in the world, dubbed "the keystone of the Pacific," from which during the Vietnam War B52 bombers directly flew to bomb North Vietnam. Regarding the Ryukyus as its internal colony, the Japanese government had no qualms to give the full administrative, legislative, and judicial rights over the islands to the United States under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. America turned Okinawa into "the only ‘semi—colonial’ territory created in Asia since the war" as Edwin Reischauer once
characterized. The Okinawan people, immediately after their devastating battlefield experience in 1945, had to face arbitrary confiscation and enclosure of their land at the point of the bayonet for the construction of military establishments. Protests were put down by force. Though the administrative powers of Okinawa were reverted to Japan in 1972, Okinawa has never ceased to be the "keystone of the Pacific" with the U.S. base functions even heightened. In addition, the much resented Japanese military forces advanced into Okinawa sharing bases with the U.S. military. Seventy-five percent of the U.S. bases in Japan are still concentrated on Okinawa where close to 20% of the total land area is enclosed as military bases. The Okinawa people, suffering from the overwhelming presence of military bases, have been struggling for decades against bases and for peace and dignity.

But as is well known, the American bases are not the only problem arising from the alliance with the United States. The postwar Japanese military forces, now called the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were created by the extra-legal order by Occupation Supreme Commander Douglas McArthur in 1950 as the police reserve force to keep the immediate rear of the war theater secure for America. In the ensuing half a century, the U.S. strategy for this region shifted emphasis from China containment, the hot war in Vietnam, and to nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Throughout this period the U.S. was pressing Japan to accelerate its military buildup as integral to the U.S. strategy, and the Japanese government was willing to comply. The SDF has thus grown in size and capability, stage after stage, into well equipped army, navy, and air forces directly linked to, and supplementary to, the U.S. forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. By the time the Cold War ended, Japan's land, sea, and air forces had become the world's second most expensive regular armed forces.

The Japanese military role in the Cold War setting posed a chronic problem pestering the postwar Japanese statehood. As is well known, the 1947 Constitution, originally drafted by the Occupation but reappropriated and embraced by the majority of the Japanese people, proclaims a pacifist principle. The Constitution states that Japan "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." It provides in black and white that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained" and that "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." This constitution stays in force as no conservative government could dare propose its revision anticipating effective popular opposition.

It is easy to see that the postwar Japanese statehood suffered from a deep-rooted contradiction. On the one hand, Japan follows the security treaty system based on the military alliance with the United States and on the other hand the pacifist Constitution is in force as the supreme law of the nation any Japanese government has the duty to observe. The two systems are palpably incompatible. Tremendous tensions arising from the coexistence of these incompatible principles always plagued the Japanese statehood, generating two competing political tendencies. The first is the mainstream tendency embracing the treaty and alliance with the U.S. and the second the traditional progressive opposition advocating that the constitutional pacifist principle be consistently practiced toward ultimate dissolution of the SDF and withdrawal of U.S. military bases.

Talking about principles integrated into the postwar Japanese state, there is another principle
—the third that firmly guards the continuity of statehood from Imperial Japan. The very fact that Hirohito, the supreme war leader, was allowed to stay in person as Emperor in postwar Japan attests to the presence of this principle. In fact, unlike the postwar German states which disavowed the Third Reich the postwar Japanese state never clearly declared a break from the Imperial past. Since Hirohito himself was exonerated, it was impossible to inculcate lower-level war criminals. And the war responsibility problems including the well known "comfort women" cases have been covered up, evaded, and not squarely faced even now.

It should be noted that it was the U.S. occupation and the State Department that opted for the preservation of the Emperor system and decided to exonerate Hirohito. McArthur decided to utilize Hirohito and the Emperor system to facilitate occupation purposes in exchange for Hirohito’s allegiance to the U.S. cause. Thus emerged a pro-American Emperor system, which ironically was construed to symbolize the continuity of the Japanese state from the prewar Empire. Though this principle of continuity was seldom proclaimed, it has nevertheless been surreptitiously preserved in the postwar Japanese polity, which would find its way almost periodically through the mouths of Liberal Democratic politicians, in the form of diplomatistically devastating statements justifying or glorifying the imperial past, asserting that Japan had fought for good purposes—liberation of Asia from the western colonial yoke, modernization and industrialization of backward nations, etc. Strong protests would come from Asian neighbors every time such a statement was made, and many of the cabinet ministers who "talked too frankly" had to resign. But the same thing would occur again and again until and unless the continuity principle is eradicated.

The postwar Japanese state played acrobatically to reconcile the three mutually incompatible principles. To neighboring Asia, Japan would try to show its peace face, even a repentant face, when this face was useful for Japan's economic interests. But it also would turn a Cold War face to countries to which America is hostile as it currently does to North Korea and did to China during the containment period. Japan is adamantly sticking to the position that the annexation of Korea in 1910 was legitimate. To the Japanese, the government would take every opportunity to orient the public mind toward forgetting the past records of colonialism, aggression, atrocities and other war crimes. To America, Japan always behaved as a good American boy except when immediate business interests clashed.

Thus what came to prevail was opportunism, one built into the postwar Japanese statehood. Hence this paradox: opportunism raised to the principle of the postwar Japanese statehood.

It should be immediately added, though I am not fully telling the story here, that this contradictory statehood was the product of a deliberate choice by the Japanese ruling groups in the immediate postwar period. The strategic choice was that Japan would go all the way with America and concentrate on economic buildup. While modern Japan until 1945 pursued its expansionist goals at its own cost and responsibility, using its own army and resources to colonize and invade neighboring Asia, the ruling groups, after the shattering defeat, learned that repeating this would not do. Postwar Japan found itself in an America-dominated world. In Asia, the U.S. established its own politico-military system of domination in Asia rallying pro-American anti-Communist post-colonial national regimes in order to meet the thrust of the Chinese revolution and revolutionary national liberation movement. The line of thinking guiding the Japanese ruling circles was that what
Japan did for itself by using its own army was being done by the America militarily and politically, and that therefore Japan can best accomplish its own goal—becoming a big economic power—by working through, and fully identifying with, this American hegemonic system and its military machinery. This strategy worked. Price of course had to be paid to America. Okinawa with its million people was first offered in payment of the price. Military bases in Japan and remilitarization, if illegal under the constitution, had to be promoted in the same context. In the 1980s, this line of Japanese behavior was exposed to vociferous accusation in the United States as Japan's "free ride." But until Japan became economically big enough to pose a threat to America, this was the American strategy too. As Bruce Cumings states, Japan was expected to be and stayed as "an American—defined economic animal shorn of its prewar military and political clout." 

In the postwar world shaped by the American hegemony, the Japan—U.S. relationship has been, and still is, highly asymmetrical. Participating in the process of the making of the postwar Japanese statehood in the occupation period and always keeping its clout intact, America is embedded in the Japanese postwar statehood as one of its major constituent element. In other words, America has never once been external to the postwar Japanese statehood. The cases of SDF, the security treaty, and Okinawa illustrate this. Of course, this is not so to the United States. Japan as a huge economic entity matters and causes concern when economic conflicts erupt or when Japan's economic downturn as is experienced now can overshadow the U.S. and global economy. Otherwise, Japan is absent in the American mind. Japan's cooperation is always assumed in military, political, and diplomatic arenas.

Can this particular relationship shaped in the past half a century unravel in the coming century? If it can, in what manner and in which direction?

**Antinomy: the Constitution and the Military**

The constitutional antinomy between pacifism and military alliance cum SDF generated bizarre logic and situation with regard to the pacifist Constitution.

What about the constitutionality of the military alliance? On this crucial issue, the Tokyo District Court in the famous Sunagawa case, ruled as far back as 1959 that allowing U.S. forces to stay in Japan was unconstitutional as it was another way of Japan maintaining the military force prohibited by the constitution. The government immediately appealed the case to the supreme court and the supreme court repudiated the district court decision on grounds that this matter belonged in the area of discretion of the administration and was not congenial to judicial judgment. This ruling made the treaty issue immune to constitutional scrutiny. Evading this issue, the supreme court placed the treaty into a sanctuary and has since kept locked.

What about the Japanese armed forces? In the 1950s, the SDF was said to be an army without war capabilities and therefore was not unconstitutional. With the rapid later buildup of the military, this excuse failed to convince anybody, and then a new theory was contrived in the 1970s that SDF was a self-defense capability rooted directly in any nation's right to self-defense, an inalienable right even the pacifist Constitution did not deny. So, the SDF was not unconstitutional. This theory was extremely flimsy and untenable even when it was made. Critics pointed out that all this process was none else than a virtual
revision of the constitution, a revision done by its reinterpretation (constitutional revision by reinterpretation). Already, under the 1978 Guidelines the Japanese government, then headed by notorious hawk politician Nakasone, committed itself to the forward military role of Japan in the global U.S.—Soviet confrontation, with the SDF navy working for the Seventh Fleet to guard the sea lanes in the Western Pacific, Japan pledging to close the three Straits to contain the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Japan if necessary, and making war plans to meet "Far East contingencies." In actual reality, the military buildup went well beyond any limit that the "nation's right to self—defense" could justify.

But even so, this logic had to place some constraints on the scope of action of the SDF and its military commitment since the government still felt that at least lip services had to be paid to the pacifist principle of the Constitution. The constraints had the following features:

1. No overseas deployment of Japanese troops. Only "self—defense" and no participation in "collective security" actions. The SDF will fight in the Japanese territory to repel small—scale invasion, and if it alone cannot cope with the enemy, then Japan will ask the U.S. to come and help. This self—imposed limitation was conceptualized as "defensive defense"(exclusively defense—oriented policy).

2. Reaffirmation of the three non—nuclear principles (no possession, no manufacture, and no introduction from outside of nuclear weapons), the government pledge that the military expenditure would not exceed 1% of GNP (which however was expanding year after year), and three principles of non—exportation of weapons.

We must give justice to the fact that the constitutional pacifism had some constraining effects on the military doctrine. So far, in spite of all the gross violation of the pacifist clauses of the Constitution, the postwar Japanese state has in fact killed not a single person in the name of the state right to belligerency as Douglas Lummis points out. The Japanese system lacks an independent military law system. The pacifist Constitution still made a difference.

Even so, by the end of the 1980s, the fait accompli had been so entrenched that those restraining words and concepts sounded hollow to anyone. At this stage of "interpretative constitutional division," the abyss became so wide that even a giant could hardly keep their footholds on both sides of the cliffs.

**Gulf War, New World Order, and the U.N. Peace Keeping Operations**

Then the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. This could have been an historic opportunity for Japan to overcome this impossible situation by starting to grope for new and realistic ways to consistent implementation of the constitutional principles. But in between the two major events occurred the Gulf War. Bush fought this war in the name of the United Nations Security Council, mobilizing armed forces and resources from a large number of countries, crusading for his New World Order.

In the Japanese context this war was the breaking point for the postwar political and ideological setting. Using the momentum of the war, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and allied rightwing political groups set out to recontextualize the postwar dilemma so as to overcome the constitutional constraints in a new way. The slogan was Japan's international contribution. The logic used was like this: Japan faces the danger of being isolated from
the rest of the world if it hesitates to make its due contribution to the international cause of peace—keeping, the cause endorsed and upheld by the United Nations; since this is for the good cause of the United Nations, Japan can contribute to it not merely in money but also in armed personnel without contravening the policy of non-troop deployment overseas.

Bush was very tough demanding Japanese contribution. Japan complied and donated 9 billion dollars in cash in war expenses, but received no words of thanks even. In 1992, the Japanese government, panic-stricken by exaggerated fears of isolation, rammed through a Peace Keeping Operation Law opening the way for the dispatch of SDF troops overseas. The government also hastily sent the Japanese navy’s mine-sweepers to the Gulf. A channel through which Japanese troops can be deployed was thus opened. In the name of PKO, SDF troops carrying weapons have since been dispatched to one trouble spot after another—-Cambodia, Golan Heights, Mozambique, and Rwanda. One of the major constitutional hurdles was thus demolished. The devil of overseas troop deployment was coaxied in from the backdoor, who settled inside, poised to open the front door from within. The demise of the Soviet Union smoothed this process because military involvement now ceased to mean direct danger of Japan being attacked by nuclear missiles.

In this recontextualization several major changes happened in the Japanese political scene. First, the constitutional opposition headed by the Japan Socialist Party, disintegrated, the party finally entering into coalition government with the LDP. With this came an abrupt about-face of the Socialist Party. Socialist Party President whom LDP picked up as the Prime Minister, declared loyalty to the security treaty, and the party accordingly dropped its opposition to the bases and treaty. (The party name was changed to a Social Democratic Party). The reversal of the party’s programmatic stance on this matter meant the virtual loss of the traditional parliamentary base of resistance to country’s military commitment and the clear line of political confrontation having characterized the Japanese postwar politics disappeared. So did the whole issue of constitutionality of military commitment. The voices calling for Japan’s return to a "normal country" with the right to armament, became louder. Rightwing intellectuals, new and old, launched a political—ideological campaign to "rectify the masochistic view of history," demanding that mention of "comfort" women in school textbooks be erased, even claiming that the Rape of Nanking atrocities and other atrocities by Japanese soldiers had been fabricated or grossly exaggerated by the postwar progressives. Hawks or doves, the overwhelming majority of the political world achieved an informal consensus that Japan can ignore the constitutional constraints. The conservatives, humiliated by their own sense that Japan did not count in the Gulf War, jumped on the PKO bandwagon in order to qualify as a new permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the coveted power status "commensurate with Japan’s economic stature."

1995: New Pentagon Strategy
The current phase immediately followed this PKO phase. Two major factors opened it in 1995. Early in the year, the United States announced its post—cold war Asian—Pacific strategy in the form of a Pentagon report to the Congress, titled the United States Security Strategy for the Asia Pacific Region. In September, the same year, three U.S. soldiers raped a 12—year old girl in Okinawa, an incident that kicked off a stormy process of anti—base upsurge swaying the U.S.—Japan strategy to its foundation. The 1997 Guidelines should be seen against the background of the three—pronged development—-the U.S.
strategy, the revived grassroots resistance from Okinawa, and the Japanese government reaction.

The new American strategy adopted in 1995 marked the reversal of the earlier post–Cold War policy of reduction and phased withdrawal of American military presence in the region. Secretary of Defense Cohen confides, "we explicitly considered options to reduce our forward-deployed military capability, and we explicitly rejected such options." This particular strategy, called the American leadership strategy, emerged having pushed aside several other alternatives ranging from troops withdrawal through creation of loose Asian security arrangement to NATO-like regional alliance. The rationale for the choice of one and rejection of the others is that the American leadership must be ensured in this important economic region by the continued heavy American military presence. It is admitted generally that with the Cold War gone there is no enemy militarily or ideologically in the region, nor are there territorial divisions designating the areas to be defended. Then what is the military presence for? The answer given by the architects of this strategy is that "uncertainty" is the foe. In other words, the military presence is to maintain the status quo of the region to facilitate American interests. Let us listen to what American leaders say.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye Jr., the architect of this strategy, explains, "Our national interests demand our deep engagement in the region" which is backed up "with our steadfast commitment to sustain a forward military presence of about 100,000 American troops in East Asia, of whom 47,000 demonstrate our commitment to regional security and the defense of Japan."

Alliances with East Asian countries are the key to this engagement, "Reinforcing our alliances to identify their new basis after the Cold War is at the heart of the strategy." And the bilateral alliance with Japan is central. In fact, it is the "linchpin."

...no relationship is more important to our East Asian security strategy than our alliance with Japan. This alliance was crucial during the Cold War. And now that the Cold War is over and we are faced with new security challenges everywhere, it remains the cornerstone of our strategy in the region.

The U.S.–Japan security relationship is fundamental to the pursuit of American security objectives both worldwide and within Asia. (Nye)

There is another, no less important, reason why alliance with Japan is so crucial.

[Japan] continues to support our forward presence in the region, both for its own security and the security of its neighbors. The most tangible measure of this support is Japan's commitment to provide over 70% of the cost of keeping our troops on its soil. This helps our readiness, because basing troops overseas is very expensive, far more expensive than basing them at home. And it serves the U.S. national interests, by keeping the region stable and secure so that U.S. goods and ideas can flow freely. (Secretary of Defense William J. Perry)

Although the main enemy the new strategy is targeted against is "uncertainty," the reinforced alliance nonetheless has a very specific potential enemy, North Korea.
immediate security problem in the region comes from Pyongyang," Nye declares. "North Korea is a clear and present danger." Nye cites North Korea's nuclear capability and 1.1 million troops, two thirds deployed along the DMZ, and is extremely skeptical of the prospect of "a peaceful resolution of the tensions on the peninsula." The framework agreement reached with North Korea involving the nuclear issue will "take a decade or more to be fully implemented," and so "it would be a serious mistake to withdraw American troops from the region." 7

But is the threat of North Korea taken truly seriously? Secretary of Defense William Cohen: "we are going to have a presence on the Korean Peninsula even when there is a unified Korea." 8 What? Isn't it because North Korea is a "clear and present danger" that American troops have to be there? What is the American troops for in a unified Korea?

The message is clear: the American military will stay for decades with or without clear and present danger. "So I think whatever year we're talking about—2020, 2030—-we will want to have the same basic strategy of shaping, responding and preparing for the future."(Cohen) The rationale is, in Nye's words, "the need for a strong forward United States military presence in the Asia-Pacific region to protect vital American interests."

Isn't it arrogant for the Pentagon to dream of it being able to shape the future in this manner? Is it also wise for America to try to do so when this is admittedly the most dynamic and fast changing region of the world? Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keelh criticized the Nye initiative as "ossified" and "outdated" from the point of view of realism, in their Foreign Affairs article. 9 Though their reasoning is not quite the same as ours, they are at least more sane and realistic than the Pentagon by asking "How can the United States indefinitely prop up an old alliance with Japan without the shared Cold War values and commonly perceived threats that created the alliance in the first place?"

The Guidelines: Japan's Commitment to Fight War
The revised Guidelines came as a major tool to implement this regional/global strategy. Reorganization had to begin with the linchpin—-U.S.—Japan alliance.

In April 1996, what Joseph Nye called "the most important summit since the end of the Cold War" took place in Washington by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto who signed a joint security declaration. The declaration, Nye said, was "an historic reaffirmation of our security alliance" ensuring that "the U.S.—Japan security relationship will not only survive to the end of this century, but will endure to help shape the next century." Hashimoto endorsed the new American strategy to the point of welcoming the continued presence of 100,000 troops and agreed to redefine the 1960 Security Treaty in accordance with the new strategic requirements. The new Guidelines, released in September 1997, is the product of a process launched by this summit.

But what kind of diplomatic arrangement can a "guidelines" be? Is it a treaty? Is it an international protocol like the Japan—U.S. semi-conductor agreement? It is neither. It is a working document of a low status worked out by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, a working committee of the Security Consultative Committee functioning under the 1960 Security Treaty. Not being a regular international agreement, it was not even signed by government representatives. Nor is it stated which text, English or Japanese, is
the official text. Were it a treaty, it would have to be put into parliamentary procedures to be debated, revised, and ratified or rejected. Being a document of a low ambiguous status, it escapes all such procedures of public scrutiny. It simply went into effect as it was announced on September 23, 1997.

In spite of its dubious legal status, the new Guidelines, as the Asahi Shimbun rightly characterized, is nothing but a new military treaty in its contents. The Japan Times ran the headline: "Japan, U.S. unveil war manual." The war manual provides for Japanese SDF participation in wars America initiates and fights practically anywhere in the world if considered relevant to Japan's security. Japan takes on the obligation to mobilize its public and private sectors to provide logistic support for the American military fighting its war. Clearly none of these commitments is justifiable under the 1960 security treaty, let alone by the pacifist Constitution even in its wildly reinterpreted version. This whole process therefore can be considered a silent coup d'etat disrupting the very basis of Japan's constitutional system. But let us examine what it stipulates.

The Guidelines roughly covers three areas, peacetime coordination, responses to attacks on Japan (including U.S. bases and forces in Japan), and responses to "situations in areas surrounding Japan," precisely defining modes of joint operations, logistic mobilization, role division, and mechanisms of coordination in each of these areas.

The most controversial part is about "situations in areas surrounding Japan." The "situations" from the context can be read only as contingencies, a crisis situation considered to require military intervention.

But where are the "areas surrounding Japan" and what are "situations" therein? Here the guidelines stuns the reader by stating: "Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational." Can you believe this is a formulation given in a very serious government—to—government document? The 1960 Security Treaty talks about the "Far East" as the area U.S. forces' action can cover from Japanese bases. The Japanese government, pressed by opposition, defined the Far East as an area north of the Philippines. But this time, we are told that the "areas" surrounding Japan are not geographical. Are Korea and Taiwan—China considered "areas surrounding Japan"? What are "situations"? The Guidelines text does not give a definition. The only definite reference is the above quotation. It is only descriptive. Both key concepts are thus incredibly vague and open to any arbitrary interpretation. Besides, who will decide this is the "situation"? Who will decide this is one of the "surrounding areas"? Nothing is said about it in the Guidelines. Concerning the "areas surrounding Japan," however, Nye gives some hints: "the U.S.—Japan security relationship is fundamental to the pursuit of American security objectives both worldwide and within Asia." So does Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell: "U.S.—Japan security cooperation has formed a critical backstop to our strategy for integrating China into the region, for moving toward a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests as far as the Persian Gulf." (testimony at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April, 1997; underline added) The implications are clear. Though North Korea, Taiwan Straits, and other geographical "surrounding areas" are certainly to be included, any area in the world can be deemed a surrounding area if and when a "situation" which the United States judges to be a
crisis possibly requiring U.S. military intervention arises there and if and when the United States says this crisis influences Japan's peace and security. That the Guidelines involves Japanese military roles "everywhere" and "worldwide," let alone Korea and the Taiwan Straits, is not just an alarmist guess considering that major aircraft carriers based in Yokosuka as well as marines based in Okinawa have already been directly deployed more than once to major crisis points including the Persian Gulf.

Should "situations" arise, the Guidelines provides, the United States and Japan will come to a "common assessment of the state of each situation" and "effectively coordinate their activities" from the early stage where such a situation is anticipated to the stage of military intervention. A long list of the areas of cooperation and coordination is attached to the text, ranging from relief activities and measures to deal with refugees, search and rescue, activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions through the use of facilities to rear area support. Each of these items involves Japanese participation in war activities. Of these items, the "use of facilities" and "rear area support" are worth special scrutiny.

Concerning the use of Japanese facilities by the U.S., the Guidelines provides that Japan will "in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. Forces of Self-Defense Forces facilities and civilian airports and ports." This clause gives the United States any places and facilities in Japan as U.S. bases in addition to those now offered for use by the United States. This will practically erase the difference between bases and non-bases. In September 1997, immediately before the announcement of the Guidelines, the U.S. sent the aircraft carrier Independence to a civilian port of Otaru in Hokkaido for a "friendship" visit, and this kicked off a drive of systematic "friendship" visits of U.S. warships to one civilian port after another all over Japan---Kagoshima in Kyushu, Sendai in Northeast Japan, Hakodate in Hokkaido, Tokyo, among others---obviously a demonstration of the American resolve for the free use of any ports and facilities.

The "rear area support" Japan is obligated to provide represents a breakthrough as it means Japanese obligation to participate as a belligerent party in warfare America fights in "areas surrounding Japan." The Guidelines states: "Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. Forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," and "the primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. Forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner." The rear area support ranges from supply, transportation, through maintenance and medical services, to security and communications. Notably the Japanese duties include, according to the annexed list, provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at civilian airports and ports as well as transportation of personnel, material and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas. Logistic support obviously is integral part of military operations, and so fulfilling these missions means nothing but Japan's participation in war operations outside of the Japanese territory. Conscious that such commitment goes against the Constitution, the Guidelines resorts to a petty trickery of limiting Japan's logistic support to "the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted." As all military experts point out, there cannot be any clearly demarcated areas where combat operations are conducted or not conducted as the "enemy" would immediately expand combat operations to where materials, fuels, and personnel are being delivered to the
U.S. combat forces.

In this logistic operation, Japanese resources, personnel, and government functions in addition to the SDF are fully mobilized for the war as the Guidelines states: "Japan will make appropriate use of authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets."

The Guidelines divides the bilateral defense cooperation into two categories—bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, the former in case Japan itself is attacked and the latter for situations in surrounding areas. The distinction is only rhetorical, however. In the first case (including an attack on U.S. forces stationed in Japan), the Japanese Self—Defense Forces fights a real war, taking the "primary responsibility" for the operation with the U.S. support. "In conducting bilateral operations, U.S. Forces and the Self—Defense Forces will employ their respective capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective Forces' ground, maritime, and air services."

The distinction between Japan's full military operation and rear area support would be in reality non—existent if a "situation" arises in the Korean Peninsula as is supposed by the Guidelines. The U.S. forces in Korea and Japan are completely integrated, and engagement in Korea automatically means that Japan enters into the war theater. The distinction between the two thus is a political fig leaf that will be blown off the moment a "situation" arises in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East. Anticipating this, the Guidelines provides: "Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan."

The Guidelines lays much emphasis on "cooperation under normal conditions" and bilateral mechanisms of coordination. "The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies" so that there be no disagreement when a situation arises. Asked whether Japan has a different perception about a "situation" in surrounding areas, in June 1997, then Foreign Minister Ikeda replied that "in reality a situation in which Japan differs from the U.S. would be evaded since, when 'situations' are anticipated, the two countries will immensely intensify exchange of views and information to meet such situations." (Upper House Cabinet Committee, June 16, 1997)

Two bilateral mechanisms are to be set up under the Guidelines. One is the bilateral coordination mechanism (center) as the U.S.—Japan Joint Command handling joint military planning. Under this, integration of the SDF and its operations with the U.S. command will be perfected to the degree that the "two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations."

In addition to this military mechanism, the Guidelines calls for another mechanism for mobilization of Japanese society as a whole for "rear area support." Called the comprehensive mechanism "for bilateral planning and establishment of common standards and procedures," this mechanism will be composed of "not only U.S. Forces and the
Self-Defense Forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments. This is to be a high-powered mechanism capable of mobilizing resources, services, assets, personnel, facilities, and authority of local governments for war purposes. The resources to be mobilized range from airports, ports, railways, roads, maritime services, ground transportation services, engineering and construction to hospitals and civil services.

Attention should be paid to a peculiar character of this comprehensive military-civilian mechanism. Though called a bilateral mechanism, it is not concerned with resource and personnel mobilization of the two parties. Its mission is to mobilizes only Japanese resources for war.

Since war mobilization is not presupposed under the Japanese constitutional system, the fulfillment of the tasks and missions given by the Guidelines requires introduction of a parallel wartime legal system centering on emergency legislation capable of suspending citizens' freedoms, justifying compulsory requisitioning of materials, services, and drafting of personnel. In fact, the Japanese military and the LDP hawks have ever since the 1960s been dreaming of introducing a whole emergency system justifying martial law. Several complete drafts of such legislation have long been prepared waiting for a cue to come to the stage. The Guidelines has certainly created a golden opportunity for the debut of this kind of legislation. The government has presented to the Diet a Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (providing for various obligations to mobilize local resources and services in a "situation"), an amendment to the Self-Defense Law, and a revised Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA) to minimally meet the Guidelines requirements. But these should be seen as the tip of a huge iceberg—draconian contingency legislation facilitating militarization of the Japanese society as a whole.

All told, Japan committed itself to fight a real warfare together with the United States. But on what legal and constitutional grounds is such action justified? When Japan constitutionally has no state right to belligerency, on what right can SDF soldiers fighting the war be absolved of the crime of murder by killing other human beings in combat operations? The Japanese state renounces war as the sovereign right of the nation. If not the sovereign right of the nation, what right is invoked to justify fighting war? The rhetoric of "interpretative revision" can no longer help. The Guidelines simply erases and annuls Article 9 of the Constitution without due constitutional procedures (referendum). One of the three principles, the best one at that, of the postwar Japanese statehood is being uprooted and thrown away by this bilateral military arrangement.

**Okinawa and Tokyo Government**

This breakthrough by the U.S. and Japanese governments was not easy to make. Nye admitted: "The road leading to this summit was not easy. It was, in fact, quite difficult, because it led through Okinawa." Why? Nye explains, "Last year (1995), the brutal rape of the 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen became a catalyst for many Japanese to question the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, with some calling it a relic of the Cold War." (Defense Issues, vol.11, no.49) I am not giving here details of the Okinawan people's struggle as we have here a friend from Okinawa to tell the story. But it should be clear that in the process leading to the making of the Guidelines the U.S. and Japanese governments had to wrestle with powerful people's movement in Okinawa that called into question the very premises of the alliance strategy—military dominance in the
name of security. The Okinawan people stand firmly and with dignity in the way of the American strategy.

The rape case occurred in September 1995 just when the World Women’s Conference in Beijing was discussing violence against women in war and young girls’ rights. Against this background, the heinousness of the crime was brought to the world’s attention as a typical case of military violence directed against women, and young girls. Shocked by widespread condemnation, President Clinton had to officially apologize for the crime.

It was Okinawan participants in the Beijing Conference who immediately after coming back from Beijing launched a new forceful movement. The women’s action was directed not only against American military bases but also against the military as such. It was a new movement radically renewing the idea of security. As one of the movement’s energetic leaders Ms. Takazato Suzuyo brought it home, women’s security is not compatible with the military whose essence is violence. "A poet once described the base as the man and the town around it the woman. The base is an organized body internalizing sexual discrimination and racism, a mechanism aimed at threatening, dominating, and conquering others with the show of force of nuclear, chemical, and other ultra-modern weaponry, printing the mentality of violence into individual human beings through training, exercises, and real war," Takazato said. (Takazato Suzuyo, Okinawa no Onna-tachi: Josei no jinken to kichi/guntai [Women in Okinawa: Women’s human rights and bases vs. military bases and military], Akashi Shoten) The women’s initiative and the feminist angle injected a new dynamic factor into the decades long struggle of Okinawan people against the bases. All social forces in Okinawa mobilized, including anti-war landlords refusing to continue to lease land for the bases, trade unions, teachers, and students. In October, a big anti-base rally in Naha drew an unprecedented 80,000 Okinawan people from all walks of life. Governor Ohta of Okinawa Prefecture decided to refuse to collaborate in procedures for the continued use for U.S. bases of land owned by private landlords. Three thousand landowners whose land had been requisitioned as base sites had earlier refused to renew their land lease contracts which were expiring in May 1997. The Governor’s resistance put the Japanese government into an impossible position as without the Governor agreeing to sign renewed lease on behalf of the refusing landlords, the use of the base sites by the U.S. military would become illegal. Now Okinawa headed by Governor Ohta came to confront the mainland government.

The Okinawa-wide struggle in multifaceted forms have since unfurled, making the issues of the U.S. bases in Okinawa not only the central political issue of Japan but also the major obstacle to the enforcement of the new Asia-Pacific strategy.

The Tokyo government had to do something vis-à-vis this critical situation. On the one hand, the Hashimoto cabinet wanted to appease by promising increased economic aid and pretending to negotiate with the U.S. on the "alleviation of the burdens of bases" on the Okinawan people. The U.S.—Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) met hurriedly where the U.S. decided to return the Futenma marine base situated in the middle of Ginowan City on condition that an alternative base be offered. The United States also agreed to return some unused parts of the bases. These are token measures, however. Talking about SACO work, Nye added, "all of this with no sacrifice of military capability or readiness." Though the Japanese government bombastically praised itself for its "success"
in getting some bases back, but the Okinawan people were not at all appeased because nothing substantive had been achieved. In response, Okinawan people's movements initiated a referendum which was held in September. Of those who cast votes, 89% said no to the bases. They demanded that the U.S. bases be drastically reduced and that the unequal Status of U.S. Forces Agreement be revised in favor of the rights of the local community.

Tokyo never complied with these Okinawan demands and never once negotiated real base reduction or revision of the agreement. On the contrary, the government behaved haughtily and menacingly taking a series of retaliatory measures—proposing to move the Futenma base to less populated Nago City in Okinawa and railroading a bill which practically deprived the Okinawan prefectural government and local land requisitioning commission of their power to decide on compulsory land appropriation. This latter measure was to enable the central government to freely offer the U.S. land areas whose anti-war landlords refuse to lease even if the Okinawan authorities decide otherwise. The proposal to move the notorious base to Nago was rejected by the Nago citizens in a local referendum held this year. Governor Ohta made it clear that he would not agree on the construction of the new Nago base.

The toughest resistance to the new U.S. strategy continues from Okinawa. The confrontation between the central government and Okinawa persists involving a host of knotty legal, political, and social problems. Inspired by the definitive voices from Okinawa, people's action is now spreading in mainland too. In addition to traditional peace movements and women's movements, groups and organizations in the sectors earmarked for war mobilization under the Guidelines are beginning to voice opposition, such as the seamen, dock workers, and local government employees. Local governments themselves feel extremely uncertain about roles they may be forced to play in war mobilization, some local assemblies passing critical resolutions and recommendations to the central government.

When faced by the Okinawan resistance, the government could have behaved differently. It could have renegotiated at least the terms of alliance with America in favor of Okinawan people and Japanese people in general, using, if you like, the Okinawa card. But it did not do so at all. On the contrary, the government, backed by America, opted to impose the American terms and the Guidelines on its own people. Why has this happened?

Lacking principles and consistent policies, unable to deal with the economic crisis, and discredited by the overwhelming majority of the people (the shattering defeat in the recent Upper House elections), the LDP government finds itself on an extremely shaky ground. The more shaky its political base, the more tightly it wants to cling to the United States, showing its readiness to accept whatever Washington would say. There are two reasons for this. Basically, the LDP government prefers to try a new ride on the new U.S. strategy, if a very expensive ride, to achieve its long dreamed—of status of a country with an authentic military that can use military forces, if under the command of American generals, without being encumbered by constitutional constraints. Generally, the LDP government believes that the U.S. military dominance backed by its nuclear deterrent power offers the structure to ensure the freedom—of—capital regime of which Japanese capitalism is part.
Alternative future: Our Alliance

But we realize that the U.S.–Japan relationship thus shaped does not contain in it even a modicum of hope. Predominating this relationship are words like nuclear deterrence, power projection, strategic alliances, forward deployment, economic sanction, mega-competition, free markets, deregulation, privatization, and so on, words not mirroring any human faces of the people. These words constitute the official discourse imposed on us as though it were the only possible way of talking and perceiving. This discourse straitjackets our imagination, freezes our thinking, and paralyses our action.

The first thing we should do is to unthink this official discourse. Unthinking processes already start when we begin to ask, for instance, what we mean by security. Does the military really protect the lives of citizens, women, children, minorities? Why in this century far more people in the world have been killed by the military and state of their own country than by the military of foreign countries? Has the "state security" anything to do with people’s security? Is the globalization regime legitimate when it victimizes so many workers, women, communities, and environment? Is the global policing power of America servicing the globalization regime justifiable? Is it to be tenable and sustainable in the coming century? Can we unthink the official story of the U.S.–Japan relationship? Sensitive questions also will be asked, like, was the killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians including children by a single bomb blast not a crime against humanity irrespective of the nature of the war?

I feel, this is the time and historic opportunity to ask some fundamental questions about matters assumed as unquestionable over the past decades. For the Japanese people, we cannot hope to establish normal relationship with neighboring Asian people Imperial Japan trampled undertoot without fundamentally questioning the postwar state that has served as the political and ideological device not to admit the crimes and settle the past. This is a huge, historic task and mission, going far beyond mere friendship building— a search for the basis of solidarity and new alliances to replace the state-to-state military alliances.

I think there is ground for this kind of alliance between the Japanese people and American people. No doubt the Christian church and Christianity have a major role to play in this work because solidarity I am talking about is almost coterminous with love—reflective love mediated by other people’s realities and substantiated in action. On this basis, I expect a broad coalition across the Pacific to be formed and developed and educational and organizing work undertaken in both countries to reverse the dominant tide and create a new tide toward peace and people’s security.

For this, we need to set ourselves immediate common goals on our way to our common alternative future. These may include:

* Denuclearization of the Asian-Pacific region and initiatives by the nuclear powers for serious nuclear disarmament;
* Asian-Pacific state-level security arrangement based on phased but systematic arms reduction and phased but prompt withdrawal of American troops and bases (integration of the ASEAN Regional Forum and other subregional arrangements);
* Full trust generating measures to ease the political–military climate of the Korean Peninsula, with the U.S. signing a peace treaty with North Korea and Japan promptly normalizing relations with North Korea and settling the issues arising from Japan’s colonial
rule;
* Abolition of the U.S.—Japan Guidelines and phased termination of the security treaty and U.S. bases in Japan and Korea, beginning with immediate withdrawal of American marines from Okinawa and mainland Japan, drastic reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa designating the date of complete withdrawal from Okinawa; the security treaty will be replaced by a new non—military bilateral arrangement of peace and amity;
* Phased reduction in the Japanese Self—Defense Forces and reorganization of its weapon systems into convincingly defensive systems placed under the sole control of the Japanese government, as steps toward abolition of the SDF as the regular armed forces;
* Convening and institutionalizing a People's Security Forum where people's organizations, NGOs, religious and other organizations concerned with people's security meet, discuss, and agree on mutual peace arrangements and exert influence on governments and international mechanisms.

We know how difficult it is to achieve even a single one of these transitory objectives. But we also do know that, as the Okinawan people are daily showing, people's resistance and people's alliances can sway the war machinery. The hegemonic machinery bases its claim to rule on the insolent assumption that people themselves are incapable of managing their affairs. Our work begins with depriving them of this excuse.

Notes:
2 Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," ibid., p.35
4 J. S. Nye Jr., Defense Issues, DOD, vol. 2, no.49
7 Foreign Affairs, op.cit.
10 Testimony of Dr. Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Affairs before the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 15, 1997
After the Tests: The Real Test

Lakshmi Daniel

They dream:
That those swine in man's shape
Who do not know how to use the power from the earth's center except for slaughter
Survive only in illustrated books for the little ones.
That the energy of ten million horsepower per gram, one thousand times as strong as high explosive,
Be delivered, out of the atom into the hands of the people.
That the rich harvest of science
Be conveyed, in peace, to the people
Like bunches of succulent grapes
Wet with dew
Gathered in
At dawn.
"Morning" by Toge Sankichi

One would have thought that the euphoric celebrations in the streets of cities in Pakistan and India this past May were to laud the nations' discovery at finding a cure to end poverty, or to acclaim the nations' success at winning the World Cup (in cricket).

Instead, the people goaded on by their respective governments and politicians were out in force to celebrate the potential to annihilate each other, masking the jubilation as pride in a nation's scientific and defense achievement.

It was obvious from the outset, that if either side took the unilateral decision to undertake nuclear weapons-oriented testing, the other side would respond. By acting first, India gave Pakistan the opportunity to represent itself as the potential victim and resort to its own tests as an inevitable defensive rejoinder. The same would have occurred had Pakistan tested first.

On May 11 – the Lord Buddha's birthday – and May 13, India conducted a series of five nuclear tests at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert, acts justified to "silence our enemies and to show our strength," according to the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee. Pakistan's response was five tests on May 28 and a sixth on May 30 at the Chagi Hills, a remote region of the Balochistan desert near the border with Iran and Afghanistan. The aim was to restore strategic balance in the sub-continent and was undertaken solely in the interests of national security and integrity, said Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistan Prime Minister. This was, he continued, "a befitting reply to any misadventure by the enemy."

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Political expediency and posturing aside, the real fall-out of these tests lies in what now appears to be an insurmountable rift in the relationship between the two countries. This is desperately tragic given that from the early 1990s, relations between Pakistan and India had begun to improve. Talks had taken place, both official and unofficial, and common interest groups, including women, writers, artists, environmentalists, human rights activists and sports men and women, had had opportunities to meet and dialogue. Last year, as the two nations celebrated their independence (and for Pakistan, its creation), memories of the past helped recall a common bond, between families and friends divided, in culture, heritage and even language and religion. These exchanges and recollections had helped to create an atmosphere of friendship, and had strengthened the knowledge of what ordinary people had long been aware: that there is more that unites than divides them.

Herein lies the real test after the tests: how to rebuild trust and reconciliation between the people of Pakistan and India? How can they be encouraged to ignore the increasing chauvinistic and jingoistic language of war against their neighbour? How can peace, as a talking point, be rejuvenated?

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There are two particularly disturbing issues that come to the fore in any discussion on the tests in India and Pakistan.

The first is the absence of any wide-ranging democratic discussion or review on such a vital issue as this. Neither government saw fit to consult its people, yet both exonerated their decisions in the name of precisely the same people. The people's initial response, however, was more than the governments could have dared hope for. The immediate reaction was a kind of ecstasy which gripped cities, as the predominantly urban middle class danced in the street, set off firecrackers, distributed sweets and even offered special prayers in mosques and temples for the integrity, stability and prosperity of their respective countries.

As portrayed both in the domestic and international media, these outpourings were assessed to be an absolute endorsement of the tests. Photographs of Vajpayee and Sharif being feted, at their residences and offices, helped perpetuate the myth of unanimous approval. Unfortunately, the voices of those who expressed dismay and caution were made peripheral and remained unheard in the midst of the jingoistic cacophony. What the majority of the country thought the rural peasant farmer was entirely by-passed, as if their opinion was worthless.

The fact that the support was not unanimous does not, however, belie the impact that such behaviour had on the nation as a whole. It seemed common sense and circumspection had been temporarily replaced by unprecedented nationalistic fervour glorifying an intangible feat.

This is the second disturbing issue that emerged: public discourse, even amongst scientists and politicians, the media and the public, almost entirely excluded discussion of
the type and extent of devastation that such weapons of mass destruction could yield. Instead, there was a crowning, on both sides of the boarder, amongst the military, scientific and political communities, that a pinnacle had been attained, making each nation a force to be reckoned with on the international stage. The absence of even sober reluctance at the thought of their possible use is horrific.

Now, more than a month after the tests, the euphoria has thankfully subsided. The political parties that had blindly supported the testing in both countries, as well as the people, have come to realize that the tests do have repercussions in other areas of domestic life in which the international community is not concerned.

It is now more than obvious that by invoking the specter of the neighbour as enemy, India and Pakistan have resorted to an age-old tactic to divert public attention from the ills, squabbles and discontent at home. And for a while this tactic worked.

Within six months of coming to power, the BJP had an urgent need to demonstrate its prowess in the midst of its minority, coalition government made up of 18 factious parties. India cannot afford to go back to the polls if this government falls and by conducting the tests, the BJP was well aware that political parties across the spectrum – save for the Left – would not want to be seen as weak on defense. This, the BJP realized, could be used to create an "enforced" national consensus of opinion to support a tottering government. The BJP had to be seen, not simply as a "Hindu nationalist" party, but as an "Indian nationalist" party. The tests were a means to reach out across the Hindu/secular divide to unite very broad sections of the Indian populace and emerge as "the only party capable of providing India with a coherent, assertive, visionary leadership." 3

Similarly in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, while not protecting a minority coalition, had to contend with core issues like rising religious antagonisms between Christians and Muslims, mounting poverty, sharp increases in prices [and] the worsening law and order situation. For his government, the tests also overshadowed these domestic concerns and, like India, the country was being asked to rally around the flag vis-à-vis the perpetual bogeyman – the neighbour.

In spite of this "enforced" consensus, following the tests, a state of emergency was imposed in Pakistan and all fundamental rights suspended, ostensibly to deal with the looming financial crisis once sanctions were imposed. The Prime Minister further announced a number of official austerity measures, including pledging that the government would turn over some of its palatial office buildings to become schools, hospitals and women's universities.

Suddenly, as if asleep, opposition parties awoke to the silent cries of human rights activists that domestically something was amiss. The relationship between nuclear testing and the sudden imposed authoritarian rule seemed tenuous at best, hinting at a hidden political agenda on the part of Sharif. 4 For Pakistanis, having the nuclear capabilities to "win" a war against India suddenly does not seem so impressive in light of
the subtle erosion of rights at home.

Now, beyond all the excuses and justifications lies the irrefutable realization that the people of the subcontinent, across the boarder, are the ultimate (and equal) victims, not the politicos who have determined policy. With both governments committed to increases in defense spending and political priorities safely in the hands of the warmongers, resources will be diverted away from essential welfare programmes in the fields of health, education and poverty alleviation. It is the spending of scarce resources to attain, and then to maintain symbols that some might argue are the climax of modernization. Both countries now have the ability to explode nuclear devises, but they still don’t have the ability to afford to all their citizens clean drinking water. This more than anything else, illustrates that India and Pakistan continue to live in, what the author Arundhati Roy has called, "parallel centuries".

If we have learnt our lessons from the history of the Cold War, we know full well that strategic and tactical advantages in relation to weapons technology is a constantly shifting line. Each side plays catch up, at greater and greater expense both financially and militarily.

While both countries blame each other for forcing them to test, they have also come together in blaming the United States and other western powers for determining the agenda in global politics where power and nuclear deterrence were seen as commensurate and they may well be right. Thus, the well-recited verse of security is almost a by-product of politics and power. Nuclear weapons do not make a nation secure; they breed tension and "endless destructive competition" that developing countries can ill afford.

Sadly, it may be because of this selfish attitude that the people can be mobilized to look at the issue of nuclear testing in a more comprehensive and mature way. This may be the only way that progressives and disarmament activists can encourage public discussions and hearings on this issue. Those who categorically call for unilateral disarmament have very often been seen as the lunatic fringe, accused of not being realistic in terms of the geo-politics on the subcontinent, Asia and the world. Now that both countries have carried out tests and have the technology to make nuclear weapons, so what?

Until now, opposition voices were kept peripheral, but that is slowly — very slowly — changing. Articles are beginning to appear in newsprint about the military, political, economic, scientific and social consequences of being potential nuclear powers. Public meetings are being held, including one of eminent activists hoping to capture the public’s attention. In New Delhi, on June 9, a cross section of people, including political leaders, university teachers, scientists, doctors, trade unionists and peace activists, met together to raise their voices against nuclear weapons. They called on both countries to jointly take the initiative to convene a global convention of nuclear weapons and issued a call to observe August 6 (in commemoration of Hiroshima) as a day of protest against nuclear weapons.
What these small events might accomplish in light of the initial frenzied approval and continued government rhetoric is unclear. However, serious attempts must be made to increase public awareness about each nation's nuclear position. The Indian and Pakistan governments must be made to immediately halt their programme of weaponisation to induct or deploy nuclear weapons. Further attempts must be made to engage the public in serious debates on disarmament, not just within the region, but globally. The hypocrisy of the Nuclear Five Club, whereby pious pronouncements on dismantling their own arsenals have been marginal at best, must be highlighted.

The real test has now begun and it is arduous. It is very clear that the above can only be initiated by the people of Pakistan and India far removed from the political realm, for political leaders in both countries have long lost their credibility. Both governments have shown that they have no serious interest to maintain any form of amity on the sub-continent. It is entirely up to the people to stop this madness and to demonstrate forcefully and clearly that in spite of the difficulties, reconciliation, peace and disarmament can take place.

Why haven't we learned from the hibakusha – those exposed to the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? The poignant words of one hibakusha is something that we could all do well to heed and reflect, "I felt that we should not have war any more – that this kind of history has repeated itself too many times... that to retain bitter feelings and to pass along bitter feelings toward others in life is the greatest tragedy of all." 6

Notes:
2 "Widespread jubilation all over the country" in Dawn, 29 May, 1998.
From Thailand and Indonesia to South Korea, up until a year ago countries that had been on the crest of the wave of rapid economic growth were being praised as heralding an "Asian Age" for the 21st century, and world attention was lavished on their economic development. However, in around spring 1997 the situation changed completely, with Thailand's economy being the first to grind to a halt; next South Korea, which had been extolled as a model of growth, saw its economy descend into chaos; then since this spring Indonesia has moved from economic dislocation to political upheaval, and as is generally known this led to the collapse of the Suharto government. Why did these troubles break out so suddenly and over such a wide area? In order to understand the situation, it is first necessary to explain how this economic growth developed.

The background to economic growth
Needless to say the situation is different in each country. Here I would like to consider the question of why, while Latin America was quick to falter and signs of growth were not in evidence in African countries, East Asia was able to ride the wave of economic growth.

The first thing that can be said is to note the existence in East Asian countries of the factors in the working of the market economy that is the basis of the post-war world economy, and furthermore of the social class that is its driving force. Of course the conditions for this background are healthy economic activities: goods produced are saleable, there are merchants who will deal in them, large-scale merchants trade with overseas partners, and with the currency thus obtained they may buy the necessary goods for their daily life and economic dealings. These conditions do not prevail in Africa and elsewhere, and therefore the economy cannot be viewed as having sufficiently evolved. East Asia has gradually developed in this area since around the 1960s.

Secondly, as economic activity becomes brisk, and especially as economic relations with foreign countries increase, the relative importance of imports and exports increases and the necessity for funds (capital, in general terms) to finance these becomes vastly greater. Capital was particularly necessary following World War Two because of the rapid development of industrial technology. In addition, wages for workers in Asia are comparatively low, less than one tenth those of the U.S. or Japan. As machine operation was progressively simplified, textiles and home electronic appliances rapidly began to be produced in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. However, capital was necessary to purchase machinery and raw materials. In order to engage in large-scale economic activity a corresponding degree of funding is necessary, but it is not possible to procure this amount of capital domestically.

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Here we encounter a third issue, that of international capital loans or the influx of foreign capital. If foreign capital merges with industries of those countries to form companies, or lends funds to enterprises in those countries, it is according to a calculation that this will be profitable. The basis for this calculation is the first point made above, namely the way in which the economy is organized and the existence of management and workers. East Asia was viewed as fulfilling these conditions. For this reason East Asian countries attracted a great deal of foreign capital and attained high growth during the 1970s and 1980s.

Why did the growth economy collapse?

Contrary to expectations, the growth economy collapsed completely. Why was this? Perhaps we may say that there were two internal factors. One was that wages went up, and the other was the rise of democratic movements. Economic growth was to a greater or lesser extent accompanied by inflation. The demand for labor also became great, and this invited a rise in wages. In less developed countries with low wages levels this was desirable. What impelled this development was the rise of democratic movements that accompanied economic growth, and it may be said that one aspect of this was the increasing vitality of trade union activity. In South Korea, for example, a labour shortage developed; foreign migrant workers entered the economy, but on the other hand radical labor movements also became active, and year after year wages rose. This was a good thing for the workers’ lifestyle, but as a result the prices of Korean products went up and they became less competitive on the world market. As competitiveness weakens exports no longer increase, and may sometimes decrease.

At that point, what exercised the decisive influence was debt owed to foreign countries. The influence of the U.S. capital in particular was huge. Speaking generally, we may say that foreign capital works in two ways. The first is investment, as is widely seen with Japanese capital. It combines with capital in the country concerned, forms a company, and sets up a factory. Alternatively, it may build a dam and embark on generating electricity. The second means is by lending capital (loans) to another country. It may be a government or a private business which borrows the capital to set up new enterprises. These loans also have two types: short-term and long-term. Simply put, short-term loans are for a few months, and long-term loans are repaid over several years. When the economy is running smoothly long-term loans are reliable and are the norm. However, in times of crisis debtors borrow over the short term, and when economic prospects are unfavorable it is the creditor that elects to make short-term loans, if they are willing to lend at all.

We may say that the phenomenon of the present East Asian economic collapse grew out of this financial crisis. It is the U.S. capital that is so centered on finance, and when the U.S. capital judged the Thai economy to be risky it tried to pull its money out as the long-term loans fell due. Because Thailand’s economy was in difficulties the loans were changed to short-term to tide over the crisis, and the repayment period could be as short as two or three months. Creditors would simply not lend money for longer periods. The result was bankruptcy. As this spread throughout the economy, foreign capital tried to flee all at once, the economy fell into more difficulties, and eventually
collapsed. The U.S. capital is shrewd in discerning opportunities, and at the first sign of instability in the market pulls out its money to invest in more profitable areas. It was in this way that the East Asian economy collapsed.

**East Asian economic recovery**

As it happens, Japan has also been suffering from recession for the past two years or so. However, unlike Southeast Asian countries, Japan is not up to its neck in large amounts of foreign debt, and is not on the brink of collapse. Japan is the world's largest creditor nation. The United States holds huge debts from other countries, but these are owed to the U.S. capitalists, and the U.S. is actually the world's largest debtor nation. Japan is the largest creditor of the U.S. The problem is that except for the loans to the U.S. and some others, much of the money would be irrecoverable. They are bad debts.

On the other hand, the problem with East Asian nations is that they do not possess the necessary capital to support economic growth. This means that they depend for the most part on foreign debt to provide the capital needed for growth. At times of sustained growth this capital was comparatively easy to obtain. During such periods, capital reserves will also have accumulated. However, they tried to grow too fast, and East Asian countries increased their debt to an unsustainable proportion. When it became clear that economic growth was coming to a standstill this excessive foreign debt made itself clear, and at a stroke the situation changed from one of growth to one of collapse.

The developed countries, which are the creditor nations, are attempting to rebuild the situation and restore equilibrium to the world economy. In concrete terms, this means finance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Within these two organizations, it is the U.S. that has the power to lead. The U.S. is basically applying free-market policies to the economic restructuring of East Asia, and guiding each country in this. However, in East Asian nations whose economic structures are not able to take on the free-market system, this sort of reconstruction will cause great social problems. I believe that the universal free-market policies should be jettisoned and measures devised from a more structural viewpoint, allowing for some leeway in the time taken to cope with the situation. (Translated by Claire Debenham.)
Solidarity with Democratization in Indonesia:
Report of a Meeting with Indonesian Representatives

Kuze Reiko

A group of four representatives from Indonesia, which is being buffeted by the winds of 'reform', visited Japan between 16–23 July (although one member of the group had to return home unexpectedly on the 18th). Proposed by Independent Welfare Labor Union (SBSI) leader Muchtar Pakpahan, who had been arrested and imprisoned on charges of attempting to overthrow the government and insulting the president, the visit was organized by his friends, missionary couple Kimura Koichi and his wife. The purpose was "to explain the meaning of 'reformasi' [the Indonesian word for 'reform'] to the Japanese government, labor unions, religious people, and student groups". The following is my report of a meeting held at Shimbashii, Tokyo, on Saturday 18 July.

After words of welcome by President Yamazaki Michito of the National Trade Union Council of Japan (Zenro) and an explanation of the background by the Rev. Kimura Koichi, Mohammad Fajrul Falaha, a teacher at Gajahmada University, first gave us a theoretical overview of the present reforms.

"Indonesia is in a period of transition between the Suharto dictatorship and a democratic society, and the reform movement is still continuing. On the surface this movement was anti-Suharto because of his failure to address the economic crisis and his attempts to suppress the citizens' discontent by violence, but even though Suharto has retired the system is still in place. Indonesian democracy has begun with Suharto's resignation, and this is not only an issue for the government but for the citizens. I would like to ask the following questions: (1) whether we can move politically towards a democratic society, and (2) how we may overcome the economic crisis.

"Without economic recovery we cannot create a healthy society, but for this we need democratization. We are aiming for reform through the unity of the people. Already, Catholic organizations, Chinese organizations, and the NU (an alliance of Indonesian Muslim leaders) are working together. Through this sort of solidarity, I believe that we will be able to sweep aside the totalitarian suppression that has been our lot up to now, while avoiding rioting. Our aim is to create a new current within society, to continue peaceful reform, and to escape from the appalling economic situation. From a social perspective, many organizations are beginning to engage in the restoration of social order. However, we are not so politically advanced, and the Habibie administration is not functioning well. The high-ranking government officials do not understand the sense of crisis among the people. The public do not believe in Habibie's economic ability, so they do not trust the administration. The only way to deal with this is through a general election. Until then the chaos will continue, so I ask for true under—

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standing and genuine solidarity from the Japanese people."

The second to speak was John Theodore Weohau, vice-president of the Indonesian Christian Student Movement (GMKI) Central Committee. He graduated in May of this year from the Economics Faculty of Satya Wacana Christian University.

"As a result of Suharto’s development policies, people’s lives have been torn apart. With the aim of restoring the basic standard of living, we took up various social issues within the university. The first was the economic crisis, and it was this that brought Indonesia’s problems into the public gaze. What the students saw in the inflation, scarcity of goods, bankruptcy, and unemployment were three evils of the Suharto government. The first was prearranged collusive bidding with dishonest intentions, the second was rampant corruption, and the third was nepotism. These resulted in economic decline, the suppression of human rights and conflict between social and ethnic groups. The students opposed these and held demonstrations, which spread to other pro-democracy groups and came to a head. It was not only the students who forced Suharto to retire, and it wasn’t something that suddenly happened in May. In February the Indonesian Youth Forum had been held, and this openly issued a rejection of Suharto. Furthermore, we [students] were the first to come up against military oppression. Fourteen students ‘disappeared’, and their whereabouts is still unknown. From beginning to end, we have insisted on non-violence. There were riots in Jakarta, but they were nothing to do with the students. And we are careful not to be taken advantage of, because we are attempting to be in solidarity with other democratic forces.

"I don’t think that the Habibie cabinet can solve the economic crisis. The students are also aware of the separatist movements in Irian Jaya and East Timor, and are aiming for reform of the whole structure of the state. The legal system needs to be revised on the basis of democracy and human rights. I also believe that economic reforms for a people-centered economy can only be carried out by a moral, clean government elected through fair and open elections."

Lastly Tohap Simanungkalit, Chair of the Central Committee of SBSI, spoke in his role as assistant to Mr Pakpahan, whom he had represented during his imprisonment.

"Japan is a rich country and has many investments in Indonesia, more so than the United States. However, in Indonesia there is little awareness of Japan outside the business world. So what we are asking for is solidarity and exchange between non-governmental organizations in both countries.

"When Suharto replaced Sukarno in 1966, he set up a new system. This was an ‘approval structure’, as if Indonesia were a single company with Suharto as the president who could decide on every aspect of the company’s management. Economic development was also organized on a top-down system. [It was believed that] if development were successful its fruits would trickle down, so the first priority was to produce results. Suharto used cheap labor as a weapon to attract foreign investment, denied the workers’ right to organize, made it necessary for every organization to obtain government approval, and plotted the fragmentation of the labor movement. When
there is severe competition, and only one person in twenty can find a job, the only thing to do is to obey one’s superiors. Eighty percent of workers in the factories have come straight from the feudalistic farming villages where they were brought up, and have never been educated about human rights or unions. They obey their superiors absolutely, and even where a union is formed it is on behalf of the government or the company. Dishonest prearranged bidding was born out of this system. This was the reality of the labor situation in the 1970s.

"In the 1980s, student groups attempted reform through NGOs. In 1992 we became aware of the need to form a labor union for the workers, and established the SBSI. This stood up against the top—down system and was severely suppressed, with all its leaders being arrested. The people who endured this are still continuing the movement to this day, and through the years it has become stronger and more widespread.

"What we were certain of from the beginning was that democracy is not something that is given to us as a blessing, but something that has to be won. In this hard struggle we have been supported from outside Asia; not a single Asian union has supported us. The largest labor union in Asia, Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), joined hands with the government to oppress us. There are no genuine labor unions in Asia. Foreign businesses are necessary, but they destroy the environment, rob us of our wealth, and exploit the people, so there is no alternative but to oppose them. One Japanese woodpulp company was bribing 200 high government officials every month, so, it became clear recently, that there was no money left to be used for the prevention of pollution. From our side, we are aware that we are responsible for correcting such abuses, but our firm hope is that from now on we may carry out this task together with Japanese workers."

The three speeches were extremely clear and powerful. Indonesian society may still face huge difficulties, but I was moved that it possesses leaders of such purity and ability, and who are moreover so young. Perhaps I was not the only person there who felt envious. I also wondered whether there really are any labor unions or student groups in Japan that might be able to respond to their passionate appeal. However, on close inspection there were several young people in the meeting who were listening quietly and attentively. These are not the same type of people as those leaders of the past who spouted ideology in loud voices, or belonged to groups which are comprised of like-minded people. They are people who personally cross international boundaries as a completely natural result of paying attention to their neighbors in their everyday lives. I would like to hope in this new type of gentle young people. At the same time, I also feel some irritation: why cannot the various peace and democracy movements, which have become old and fixed in their ideas, connect with these young people? (Translated by Claire Debenham.)